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Should state-owned enterprises change chief executive officer before privatizing? 
We test competing views on this question by complementing a recently released 
database with newly collected data. We are able to cover 77 telecommunications 
privatizations, which account for nearly 80 percent of the sector in terms of value. 
We find that CEO replacement will improve performance in the 
telecommunications industry before privatization as measured by penetration, 
operating efficiency, and profitability. CEO change before privatization does 
appear to have real consequences in firm performance before privatization. 
Moreover, findings are consistent with previous research that links CEO 
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  51. Introduction 
 
Recent research shows that the change in CEO before privatization has a bearing on privatization 
prices.  In fact, when taking endogeneity problems into account, López-de-Silanes (1997) shows 
that replacing the CEO before privatization is linked with a 54 percent increase in the net 
privatization price in the case of Mexico.  Buyers may be willing to pay higher prices for firms 
whose CEOs have been replaced, as profitability of the firm may have improved due to 
restructuring before privatization.  The new owners may have to do less tweaking with the firm 
after privatization and may reap benefits relatively faster.  This finding is particularly important 
as CEO replacement before privatization has become a relatively common policy issue in 
developing countries, and it tends to receive relatively broad political support (Chong and López-
de-Silanes, 2002a). Still, taking the findings by López-de-Silanes (1997) at face value, there is 
still some lack of understanding on the mechanisms by which CEO replacement may affect the 
productive process of a firm before privatization.   
  In this note we seek to complement the research by López-de-Silanes, by exploring the 
two key possible views by which replacement of top management before privatization may 
impact the productive process of the firm and thus increase privatization prices.  The first view is 
that a change in CEO before privatization sends an unequivocal signal to prospective buyers on 
the seriousness of the privatization process. This eliminates incentives for corruption on the part 
of the old management that otherwise, would have tried to maximize rents before the firm is 
privatized. According to this signaling view, top management replacement before privatization 
will contribute to the increase in privatization prices once the firm is on sale, regardless of any 
restructuring done before privatization (Kikeri, 1999).   
  On the other hand, according to the restructuring view, the managers of state-owned 
enterprises are good in terms of political abilities but are not good at actually running firms.  The 
current management has the wrong human capital to face competition and the new market 
conditions that the firm will soon face once it is privatized.  A new chief executive officer, with 
the appropriate human capital, is thus needed in order to implement all necessary restructuring 
and run the firm efficiently until privatization takes place (Rosen, 1992; Barberis, Boycko, 
Shleifer, and Tsukanova, 1996).  Thus, replacing the chief executive officer before privatization 
provides the firm with a step forward towards adapting the firm to the forthcoming market 
conditions before actual transference of ownership to private hands takes place.  This, it is 
  6believed, helps smooth out the transition of the firm to a competitive market economy.   
According to this view, top management replacement before privatization will yield higher 
privatization prices, as prospective buyers will value the restructuring done before privatization.
1 
  We build on a recent data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) who collect 
information on privatization characteristics of state-owned enterprises for firms around the 
world.  We focus on the sub-group of firms from the telecommunications sector.  As is well 
known, until recently this sector has been typically considered among the “jewels” of   
privatization.  Focusing on one single sector allows us to minimize potential problems related 
with industry heterogeneity.  Also, the gathering of additional data necessary for this research is 
relatively less complicated, as several data sources are available for the case of 
telecommunications.  We are thus able to expand the data set from Chong and López-de-Silanes 
and further minimize sample bias problems, if any.
2  Our paper is organized as follows.  Section 





Our sample is based on a data set by Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) who obtained 
information for 400 privatizations around the world for the period 1984-2000, of which around 
74 were from the telecommunications sector.  The sample covers about 75 percent of the 
privatizations carried out in the telecommunications sector in the world and account for an 
estimated 80 percent of the revenues brought in by privatizations in the sector worldwide during 
the 1990s (World Bank, 2001).
3  Furthermore, we are able to expand their sample for 
telecommunications firms by around five percent by using three additional sources: the firms 
themselves, the regulatory agencies, and the International Telecommunications Union (2002). To 
                                                           
1 Barberis, Boycko, Shleifer, and Tsukanova (1996) use a survey of Russian shops to measure the importance of 
alternative channels through which privatization promotes restructuring.  While they find that the presence of new 
managers in privatized firms raises the likelihood of restructuring the firm after privatization, they show that keeping 
old managers but adding equity incentives in such firms do not promote restructuring after privatization.  According 
to these researchers, their findings provide empirical support to the view that management replacement after 
privatization is crucial in the restructuring process of the firm. 
2 Still, Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b) provide evidence that their sample of firms is unbiased.  
3 These researchers prepared a detailed questionnaire addressed to the CEO with a recommendation to direct it to the 
chief financial officer and the director of human resources of the corresponding firms. They also used additional 
sources extensively, in particular, documents from multilateral organizations, regulatory agencies, ministries, and 
international publications (Chong and López-de-Silanes, 2002b). 
  7achieve this, we followed a procedure analogous to that in Chong and López-de-Silanes (2002b).  
Thus, we organized a questionnaire in two different areas. The first area covered pre-
privatization firm characteristics, such as sales, profits, liabilities, CEO change, and the presence 
of unions. The second area focused on the privatization process, and in particular, on shares sold, 
the type of sale, and foreign participation. The key explanatory variable of interest is a dummy 
variable that equals one if the firm changed CEO up to three years prior to privatization, and zero 
otherwise.
4  
  We complemented our firm-specific information with country-level macroeconomic data, 
mainly from the World Bank (2001) and Wallsten (2001).  In particular, we used the rate of 
growth, the rate of inflation, the gross domestic product, and the presence of an independent 
regulatory agency at the time of CEO replacement, among other measuress. Additionally, we 
gathered information on economic performance at the firm level from Bloomberg, Economatica, 
Worldscope, and the International Telecommunications Union (2002).
5  Following related work 
on the telecommunications literature, three basic outcome measures were collected: change in 
telephone lines per inhabitant before and after CEO change (penetration), change in telephone 
lines per employee before and after CEO change (operational efficiency), and change in returns 
on sales before and after CEO change (profitability). Table 1 presents exact definitions of all the 





Along the basic lines of the methodology by La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999), Table 2 
provides empirical evidence on the link between CEO change before privatization and change in 
economic performance after replacement. The evidence points towards a confirmation of the 
view that CEO replacement before privatization is associated with firm restructuring, rather than 
with firm signaling. Not only is the coefficient of our variable of interest positively associated 
with change in firm performance before privatization, but it is also statistically significant at 1 
                                                           
4 In fact, according to our sample, CEO change before privatization varies widely from region to region. While it has 
been common in Africa, Latin America, and developed countries, it has been much less used in Asia and Transition 
Economies. 
5 Subscription-based Bloomberg, Economatica, and Worldscope deliver international financial information in a 
standardized format that facilitates comparisons between companies, countries, regions, and industries. Worldscope, 
for instance, covers approximately 90 percent of the worlds stock market value and includes records on more than 
20,000 active companies representing over 50 emerging and established markets. 
  8percent with respect to change in penetration, and at 5 percent with respect to both change in 
operating efficiency and change in profitability. In fact, the results suggest that CEO change has 
a considerable positive impact on changes in performance, as it adds 35 percentage points to 
mean changes in penetration, 57 percentage points to mean changes in operating efficiency and 7 
percentage points to mean changes in profitability.  Interestingly, these results are stable to the 
inclusion of a dummy variable that accounts for the presence of an independent regulatory 
agency at the time of CEO replacement. The latter is also shown in Table 2.  
  Furthermore, according to our results, CEO replacement is the only statistically 
significant variable that is robustly linked with change in firm economic performance among the 
privatization characteristics considered in this research.  In fact, while foreign participation in the 
privatization process yields a positive and statistically significant sign with respect to change in 
firm profitability, it does not have any bearing on either change in penetration or change in 
operating efficiency. Similar results are obtained in the case of the percentage of shares sold, as 
such a variable is only statistically significant when associated with change in profitability, but 
not when linked with change in penetration or change in operating efficiency.
7  
  Similarly, most of the firm characteristics considered in this paper do not appear to have a 
bearing on change in economic performance either. For instance, a dummy that accounts for net 
total liabilities before privatization usually does not yield a statistically significant link with the 
change in performance variables considered, and when it does, it is at ten percent and with the 
wrong sign (operating efficiency). On the other hand, average sales before privatization is 
statistically significant with change in profitability only, while a dummy that accounts for the 
presence of unions has no bearing on performance change. However, some country-specific 
variables do appear to have a bearing on change in firm performance. In particular, a dummy that 
accounts for whether the country has pursued economic reforms yields a positive sign, which is 
statistically significant at five percent or better with respect to change in penetration and change 
in profitability. However, such a variable is only weakly significant with respect to change in 
operating efficiency in the absence of a regulatory agency dummy. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
6 Summary statistics for all the variables used are presented in Appendix 1. 
7 Moreover, we do not obtain the expected sign. 
  94. Conclusions 
 
In a context in which state-owned enterprises still represent a sizable fraction of the world’s 
gross domestic product, investment, and employment (Kikeri, 1999) and in light of the current 
political sensitivities towards privatization in several regions, we provide evidence on the 
benefits of CEO replacement before privatization that complements López-de-Silanes (1997) by 
showing that actual firm restructuring may be the missing link between CEO replacement and 
privatization prices.  From a policy perspective, our research helps provide a better 
understanding of what works and what does not work in privatization programs, and thus may 
help improve the design of future programs.  In fact, as actual firm reform appears to be the 
mechanism at play between CEO replacement and privatization prices, governments should 
weigh the trade-off between political costs and economic benefits of restructuring the firm. 
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CEO change Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company changed CEO up to three years prior to privatization, 0 otherwise  (Chong and
Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).
Foreign participation Dummy variable equal to 1 if foreign participation was allowed in the privatization process, and 0 otherwise  (Chong and 
Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).
Share sold Percentage of firm's shares sold in privatization  (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).
Independent agency Dummy variable equal to 1 when an independent regulatory agency was established, and 0 otherwise.  An independent agency
means that  the country has a regulatory  agency not directly under control of a ministry (Wallsten, 2001) .
Firm Characteristics  
Penetration Percentage change between the two-year average of firm lines per 100 inhabitants  before CEO change and the two-year average 
after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001;  International Telecommunications Union, 2002).
Operating eficiency  Percentage change between the two-year average of firm lines per employee before  CEO change and the two-year average 
after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001;  International Telecommunications Union, 2002).
Profitability Change between the two-year average of return on sales  before CEO change and the two-year average 
after CEO change (WorldScope, 2001;  International Telecommunications Union, 2002 ; Bloomberg and Economatica).
Net total liabilities Dummy variable equal to 1 if net total liabilities are greater than zero up to three years prior to privatization,
and 0 otherwise (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).  
Sales The net present value of the three-year average of firm sales before CEO change. The sales value were denominated in US$ of the
initial year (Chong and Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).
Presence of unions Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm had unions or strikes up to three years prior to privatization, and  0 otherwise (Chong and
Lopez-de-Silanes, 2002).
Country-Specific Variables
Economic growth Average rate of growth of the country three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001).
Gross domestic product Gross Domestic Product (US$ PPP) in logs.  Average of the three years prior to privatization  (World Bank, 2001).
Urban population Average percentage of urban population three years prior to privatization (World Bank, 2001). 
Expropriation risk Index that can take values between 0 and 10, with lower scores indicating a lower risk of expropriation (ICRG’s risk ratings).
Economics reforms Dummy variable equal to 1 if telecom privatization took place in an economics reform context (World Bank).








  12Table 2. CEO Change and Pre-Privatization Performance 
 
1.- Privatization Characteristics:
CEO change 0.3583 *** 0.3574 *** 0.5800 ** 0.5776 ** 0.0722 ** 0.0722 **
(0.095)  (0.095)              (0.274)        (0.266)         (0.033)          (0.033)     
Foreign Participation -0.1128 -0.0722 -0.3208 -0.2179 0.0669 * 0.0679 *
(0.123)  (0.123)              (0.261)        (0.259)         (0.039)          (0.040)     
Share Sold -0.0023 -0.0007 -0.0097 -0.0055 -0.0022 * -0.0021 *
(0.004)  (0.004)              (0.011)        (0.009)         (0.001)          (0.001)     
Independent Agency -0.2393 ** -0.6067 ** -0.0063
(0.097)              (0.229)         (0.027)     
2.- Firm characteristics:
Net total liabilities 0.0875 0.0488 0.4488 * 0.3505 0.0367 0.0357
(0.107)  (0.104)              (0.256)        (0.222)         (0.033)          (0.034)     
Sales 0.0026 0.0011 0.0064 0.0025 -0.0039 ** -0.0039 **
(0.004)  (0.004)              (0.015)        (0.015)         (0.002)          (0.002)     
Presence of unions -0.0011 -0.0972 -0.1631 -0.4068 0.0230 0.0204
(0.251)  (0.244)              (0.364)        (0.372)         (0.049)          (0.053)     
3.- Country-Specific Variables:
Economic Growth 0.0222 0.0220 0.0624 0.0617 *** 0.0049 0.0049
(0.018)  (0.016)              (0.072)        (0.068)         (0.005)          (0.005)     
Gross Domestic Product -0.0092 0.0069 -0.0790 -0.0381 -0.0256 * -0.0252 *
(0.034)  (0.031)              (0.093)        (0.092)         (0.012)          (0.012)     
Urban  Population -0.0178 *** -0.0175 *** -0.0199 *** -0.0191 *** 0.0013 0.0013
(0.003)  (0.003)              (0.006)        (0.005)         (0.001)          (0.001)     
Expropriation Risk 0.0160 0.0265 -0.0040 0.0227 -0.0728 ** -0.0725 **
(0.051)  (0.050)              (0.123)        (0.117)         (0.017)          (0.017)     
Economics Reforms 0.2653 ** 0.1919 * 0.4510 * 0.2648 0.1087 *** 0.1068 **
(0.118)  (0.112)              (0.244)        (0.226)         (0.040)          (0.040)     
Latin America 0.5677 *** 0.5879 *** 1.4845 ** 1.5358 *** -0.0580 -0.0575
(0.174)  (0.154)              (0.586)        (0.558)         (0.054)          (0.054)     
Asia 0.7435 ** 0.7280 * 0.3214 0.2822 -0.1492 *** -0.1496 ***
(0.307)  (0.315)              (0.543)        (0.559)         (0.052)          (0.052)     
Africa and Middle East 0.2725 0.3020 -0.4543 -0.3795 -0.1276 ** -0.1268 **
(0.253)  (0.243)              (0.388)        (0.393)         (0.056)          (0.056)     
Transition Economies 0.3140 *** 0.2869 ** 0.3731 0.3044 -0.1038 ** -0.1045 **
(0.142)  (0.138)              (0.351)        (0.350)         (0.044)          (0.045)     
Constant 1.3200 0.9251 3.7332 2.7318 1.2463 *** 1.2359 ***
(0.900)  (0.930)              (2.573)        (2.662)         (0.371)          (0.376)     
Observations 77 77 77 77 77 77
R-squared 0.73 0.76 0.50 0.54 0.62 0.62
F 12.81 15.54 5.47 6.59 3.85 3.62
Prob > F       0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%





  13Appendix 1.  Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Privatization Characteristics
CEO change 77 0.468 0.000 0.502 0.000 1.000
Foreign Participation 77 0.870 1.000 0.338 0.000 1.000
Share Sold 77 34.612 30.000 19.676 1.000 95.000
Independent Agency 77 0.351 0.000 0.480 0.000 1.000
Firm Characteristics
Penetration 77 0.534 0.265 0.617 0.001 2.431
Operating efficiency 77 0.862 0.351 1.231 -0.350 6.418
Profitability 77 0.059 0.040 0.165 -0.476 0.792
Net total liabilities 77 0.468 0.000 0.502 0.000 1.000
Sales 77 3.545 1.430 5.079 0.003 21.991
Presence of unions 77 0.870 1.000 0.338 0.000 1.000
Country-Specific Variables
Economic growth 77 2.928 3.319 3.726 -11.144 12.822
Gross Domestic Product 77 25.382 25.571 2.176 19.448 28.856
Urban Population 77 66.198 70.500 19.778 12.853 100.000
Expropriation Risk 77 2.221 2.000 1.510 1.000 7.000
Latin America 77 0.247 0.000 0.434 0.000 1.000
Asia 77 0.104 0.000 0.307 0.000 1.000
Africa and Middle East 77 0.117 0.000 0.323 0.000 1.000













  14Appendix 2. Firm and Country Sample 
 
Company Country Year of privatization
Albanian Mobile Communications Albania 2000
Belgacom Belgium 1995
Belize Telecommunications Ltd. Belize 1988
Bezeq Israel 1998
British Telecom United Kingdom 1984 , 1991
Bulgarian Telecommunications Co. Bulgaria 2000
CANTV Venezuela 1991
CTE El Salvador 1998
Cabo Verde Telecom Cape Verde 1995
China Telecom- Hong Kong Ltd. China 1997
Compania de Telefonos Chile (CTC) Chile 1988
Deutsche Telekom Germany 1996 , 1999
ENTEL Bolivia 1995
Embratel SA Brazil 1998
Entel and CPT Peru 1994
Entel- Telecom SA Argentina 1990
Entel- Telephonica de Argentina SA Argentina 1990
Estonia Telecom Estonia 1993 , 1999
France Telecom France 1997, 1998
Ghana Telecom Ghana 1996
Guyana Telephone and Telegraph Guyana 1991
Hrvatske Telekomunicacije Croatia 1999
INDOSAT Indonesia 1994
INTEL El Salvador 1998
INTEL SA Panama 1997
Jordan Telecom Jordan 2000
Korea Telecom Korea, Rep. 1999
Lattelekom Latvia 1994
Lietuvos Telekomas Lithuania 1998
NTT Japan 1987, 1988, 1998, 1999
P.T.Telkom Indonesia 1995
Portugal Telecom Portugal 1995, 1996, 1997
Puerto Rico Telephone Co. (PRTC) Puerto Rico 1999
Q-tel Qatar 1998
Royal KPN Netherlands 1994 , 1995
SKANTEL St. Kitts and Nevis 1992 , 1994
SPT Telecom Czech Republic 1994
Singapore Telecommunications Singapore 1993 , 1996
Sonatel Senegal 1997
Sonera Finland 1998 , 1999
Sri Lanka Telecommunications Sri Lanka 1997
Svyazinvest Russian Federation 1997
Swisscom Switzerland 1998
Tele Centro Sul Brazil 1998
TeleDanmark Denmark 1998
Telecom Eireanne Ireland 1996
Telecom Italia Italy 1997
Telecom Serbia Yugoslavia, FR  1997
Telecommunications of Jamaica (TOJ) Jamaica 1990
Telefonica del Peru Peru 1996
Telekom Austria Austria 1998
Telekomunikacja Polska SA Poland 1998 , 2000




Telkom South Africa 1997
Telstra Australia 1997 , 1999
Telus Canada 1990
Trinidad and Tobago Telephone Co. (T&TT) Trinidad and Tobago 1989
Uganda Telecommunications Ltd Uganda 2000
 
  15